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Three Main Ways of Analysing European Societies 
(Michael Hainz SJ, Munich) 
 
 
In this trial to help you to analyse European societies, I rather point to basic perspectives, 
questions and hypotheses than to detailed information and empirical proofs. This is a first 
limitation: The complex reality does always transcend our restrained efforts and models to 
catch and understand it. A second basic limit will be that I, a German Jesuit, will not be able to 
cope with the considerable economic, political and, especially, socio-cultural differences 
between European societies: My presentation will certainly be biased by my German 
background. I necessarily have to generalize, also in the sense that I will explain the three 
“ways of analysis” in a simplified, short-cut manner. The question for you will be: What is 
different or more specific in the concrete case of my country? 
 
The three approaches I propose here differ from their perspective: The first will be from 
sociology of economy (Manuel Castells), the second from sociology of culture (Ulrich Beck), 
and the third from sociology of religion. This last one will be a mixed approach, as there is no 
single convincing approach to deal with religion in Europe – it draws from David Martin, Jose 
Casanova, Joerg Stolz, Steve Bruce and Ronald Inglehart. 
 
1. Globalized capitalism as a motor of changes in power relations and social divisions 
(Manuel Castells) 
 
I first summarize some basic ideas of the comprehensive analysis in ?The Information Age” 
(three volumes with altogether some 1400 pages) by Manuel Castells.1 He was born in Spain, 
escaped under Franco to Paris, and in 1979 he was appointed a Professor of Sociology at the 
University of California in Berkeley, from where he studied the information technology 
revolution in Silicon Valley and all over the world. 
 
1.1 Which are the prime movers for the genesis of global capitalism in the information 
age? 
 
Castells traces the genesis of the current society back to three processes which took place 
between the end of the sixties and mid-seventies of the last century: First, a crisis of the 
economic development model both in capitalism and communism pushed to restructure 
economy. Secondly, libertarian social movements, like feminism, human rights and ecological 
movements claimed autonomy and experimental lifestyle and their adherents shaped a 
decentralized, egalitarian use of technology. Very important was, thirdly, the combination of 
the information technology revolution with the social form of networks: On the one hand, 
informationalism (the creation, processing and communication of data and new knowledge by 
personal computers, internet plus genetic engineering) replaced industrialism (the use of fossil 
fuels) as the material basis of society. On the other hand, the introduction of the new  
                                                 
1Manuel Castells: The Information Age, 3 vol., (Blackwell)1st ed. 1996-1998; Manuel Castells: Materials for an 
exploratory theory of the network society, in: The British Journal of Sociology 51 (2000) pp. 5-24. 
information technologies made it possible that networks (= interconnections of nodes, which 
de-centre performance and share decision-making) added to their traditional flexibility the new 
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ability to coordinate functions and to master complex issues, and therefore outperformed 
hierarchical organizations that master resources around centrally defined goals. These new 
information networks were an essential means for the transformation of capitalistic economies 
and societies, whereas the communist countries could not keep up with these new technologies. 
This was according to Castells a main reason for the collapse of their system. 
 
1.2 Which are the fundamental features and institutions of the new economy? 
 
First, this new economy is informational, which means that the capacity of generating 
knowledge and processing information determine the productivity of all kinds of economic 
units. 
 
Second, this new economy is global in the sense that its core activities have the capacities to 
work as a unit on the planetary scale in real time or chosen time. Core activities are financial 
markets, international trade of goods and services, multinational productions firms and so on. 
Castells clearly says that not all economy is global (there is a lot of local or regional markets), 
but the reach and dimension of global economy have rapidly expanded and grow in influencing 
economies and societies. 
 
Third, the new economy is networked. In order to describe this feature of networking, one has 
to look more closely to two main institutions of this new economy, namely the network 
enterprise and global financial markets. 
  
A network enterprise is centred on a business project and is made from either firms or segments 
of firms and/or - within firms - from several departments. Its composition and life-span 
correspond totally to the requirements (in terms of resources or time) of the business project. 
Legally and for the public, the firm (with the well-known name) remains the relevant unit; in 
terms of production and labour arrangements however, more and more relevant is only the fluid 
network of firms or part of firms. Its flexibility contributes to what Castells calls the “variable 
geometry of labour arrangements”. 
 
The value of a firm, which is possibly part of several of such business projects, depends from 
its valuation or devaluation in the stock market. So the firm itself becomes a node in the global 
network of financial flows. Profits from all sources (private, institutional, entrepreneurial) 
converge in search of higher profits. Therefore the global financial networks are the nerve 
centre of informational capitalism. In this network of global financial markets by electronic 
means (networking of computers) space and time are - in Castell's words – „annihilated“: 
Distances between Hong Kong and Bratislava, New York and Rome are not relevant for the 
most profitable investment, and the movement of capital happens within seconds; capital is 
always on the move. It does not follow the market logic of supply and demand; rather more 
important are distortions because of computer-enacted strategic manoeuvres, crowd psychology 
from multi-cultural sources and unexpected turbulences, caused by ever more complex 
interactions on a global scale. 
 
 
1.3 How do the relations of power and work change? 
 
  
From Castell's analysis of global capitalism follow three main consequences on the relations of 
power and work: 
 
A first trend induced by globalisation, the network enterprise and information & 
communication facilities, is the individualization or flexibilization of the relationships of work. 
It turns upside down the homogeneous pattern of industrial production.  Today, part-time work, 
temporary work, self-employment, informal or semi-formal labour arrangements, the 
feminization of paid labour and relentless occupational mobility are the key features of the new 
labour market. These individualised labour arrangements correspond to individual patterns of 
payment. In effect, this individualization impedes the capabilities to collectively organise the 
labourers. If you consider the diverging trends of the globalisation of capital, on the one hand, 
and of the individualization and, additionally, the regional or national restriction of labour 
(immigrants are intensively controlled and only in special cases admitted), on the other hand, 
you cannot avoid drawing the conclusion that the power resources of capital have increased, 
whereas the bargaining power of labour unions has structurally been weakened. One 
consequence for the affected individuals: Unstable labour arrangements and weak bargaining 
power lead to a higher level of incidence of major crises in personal and family life: temporary 
job loss, personal crises, illness, drugs, alcohol addiction, loss of assets, and loss of credit. 
 
Secondly, Castell states two sorts of social divisions: (a) within labour, more and more a 
division into two categories becomes visible: self-programmable labour and generic labour. 
Self-programmable labour is equipped with the ability to retrain itself and to adapt to new tasks 
and new sources of information - in an environment where technology, demand and 
management speed up their rate of change. Generic labour, by contrast, is exchangeable and 
disposable, and is potentially threatened by competition with machines or other unskilled, 
perhaps cheaper labour (e.g., undocumented migrants). The self-programmable workers, 
generators of knowledge and processors of information (manager, technicians, experts), 
comprise about one third of OECD-societies. They do not need individual generic labour; but 
on the flip side, these do need the former ones in order to protect their negotiation power. This 
is a first fundamental cleavage in informational capitalism. 
 
(b) Beyond the realm of employable labour, a growing portion of human beings are becoming 
irrelevant both as producers as consumers. Empirically, this irrelevance or factual exclusion 
cannot be equated with mass unemployment. Most people do work, but one has to ask: what 
kind of work for what kind of pay under what conditions? Millions of people are constantly in 
and out of paid work, often included in informal activities and also in criminal economy. The 
borderline between social exclusion and daily survival is increasingly blurred. 
 
Altogether, according to Castells these developments lead to social polarisation: The 
intermediate layer decreases, whereas the portions on the top and on the bottom of society 
increase. 
 
Thirdly, these economically induced trends of social disintegration will have more blatant 
effects than they would have in the past, because at the same time, the nation state in general 
and the welfare state (social state) in particular, are getting weaker. On one hand, the 
 
 capabilities for the national political decision-making are decreasing because of the 
globalisation of capital, the political multilateralism (EU, UN...) and the delegation of at least 
some power to lower political levels. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the state is 
undermined by its dependence on media politics and the politics of scandal. This weakened 
legitimacy and capability of national politics and social politics in particular translates into a 
situation where the social security net risks being thinned out or totally abandoned for those 
who cannot secure themselves against future crises. 
 
1.4 Normative implications, achievement potential and limits of Castells's approach 
 
1) Castell's analyses are based on broad empirical findings, both through vast personal contacts 
in many parts of the world and by referring to much empirical research of other scientists. 
 
2) Contrary to my brief summary, Castells argues in a differentiated and balanced way. 
 
3) He has a great ability to synthesize and succeeds to clearly qualify essential changes and 
newly emerging structures. 
 
4) One can discuss Castells' neo-Marxist theoretical background: I think it is helpful in order to 
understand new economic structures and power relations. Castells - against Marx - points to the 
autonomy of cultural processes, but has no sensorial framework in order to analyse cultural and 
religious changes that are independent from economic or technological influences. 
Additionally, he argues predominantly from the macro-perspective, whereas the micro-
perspective, namely the actors, the human beings with their surprising freedom and their 
personal limitations, are grosso modo neglected.  
 
 
2. Liberty in forward or reverse gear? Individualization between societal coercion and - 
already decaying? - promise of redemption (Ulrich Beck)2
 
I will firstly present a theorem proposed by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck who teaches in 
Munich and London. He started his research with a critique of class-oriented theories of social 
inequality and labour relations, and then also discussed gender issues, ecology and 
globalization. He developed his theorem of individualization in an article in 1983 and then in 
his book “Risikogesellschaft (risk society)”, first published in 1986. 
 
2.1 What does “individualization” mean? 
 
Individualization in Beck's sense has been kept free from the neo-liberal idea of the free-market 
individual, of a totally autarkic „self-entrepreneur“ who alone masters his/her life (Beck 2001: 
XXI). Contrary to a mere subjectivity or an „unfettered logic of action“ juggling in a virtually 
empty space, Beck stresses his concept of individualization as „institutionalised individualism“, 
a term coined by Talcott Parsons3. 
                                                 
2 Ulrich Beck/Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim: Individualization. Institutional Individualism and its Social and Political 
Consequences, London/Thousand Oaks/New Dehli (SAGE) 2001. 
3 Religion in Postindustrial Society. In Action, Theory and the Human Condition, New York 1978: 321. 
 
  
On the one hand, individualization means the decreasing influence, the disintegration of 
traditional meso-social forms, e.g. class, status, gender roles, family, neighbourhood, religious 
milieus or, as in the Soviet bloc, state-sanctioned role-models (Beck 2001: 2).On the other 
hand, individualization refers to the fact that new demands, controls and constraints in modern 
societies (e.g., job market, welfare state) challenge individuals and offer incentives to be active, 
to take decisions. Beck adapts Jean-Paul Sartre's phrase: People are “condemned to 
individualization”. Individualization, therefore is a compulsion, albeit a paradoxical one, to 
create, to stage manage, not only one's own biography, but bonds and networks surrounding it -  
and to do this amid changing preferences and at successive stages of life, while constantly 
adapting to the conditions of labour market, the education system, the welfare state and so on 
(Beck 2001:4): This paradoxical compulsion for everybody to live his or her own life is that 
which is meant by „institutionalised individualism“. 
 
 
2.2 What are the features of the “life of one's own”? 
  
Opportunities, dangers, biographical uncertainties that were earlier collectively predefined, 
tackled, opposed, endured and, possibly, changed within family, village community, religious 
milieu or social class, must now be perceived, interpreted, decided by individuals themselves. 
The consequences - opportunities and burdens alike - are shifted onto individuals. These are, in 
the face of complex social situations, often unable to take the necessary decisions in a properly 
founded way, that is: according to their true interests or morality. So, individualization does not 
mean „individuation“or individually successful or „good“life. Self-made biography also mean 
„broken biography“or „failed biography“. 
 
To summarize the characteristics of individualized conduct of life: As Beck puts it, one’s 
personal life has to do with more personal activity (people are „condemned to activity“, to a do-
it-yourself-biography), but also with the complete dependence upon macro-institutions (instead 
of meso-traditions). It is also characterized by an experimental style, by reflexivity, personal 
risk of failure, personal decisions and de-traditionalization. 
 
I want to explain the last two aspects more deeply: (1) The emphatic ascription of self-
responsibility has one serious consequence in case of societal crises: Unemployment, poverty 
or homelessness and other problems of this kind are no longer regarded as problems of the 
society, rather they are only interpreted as consequences of individual decisions. “It's me who 
is responsible and made a mistake”, so people say, “not the society”. This has two 
consequences: (a) Public pressure to seek, discuss and to implement political solutions might 
decrease. (b) If social crises are attributed as personal crises of the individual, then one can 
understand why individual illnesses, especially mental health problems, are so widespread. 
Social crises immediately hit - and hurt! - the individuals. 
 
 (2) The other statement that needs more explanation is that of de-traditionalisation. It does not 
mean that e.g. traditional forms of marriage or religious rituals would cease to exist. On the 
contrary, it might even be that they flourish more and more. No, de-traditionalisation means 
only that such social forms lose their character as being a „matter of course“: Instead of being 
 
 accepted in an unquestioned, normatively more or less compulsory way, they have to go 
through modern processes of reflection and decision-making. You can vote for traditional 
forms of marriage or authoritarian political convictions, but you have to argue, when e.g., asked 
by critical colleagues, and to decide yourself. Additionally, such “traditional” options may be 
propagated by modern technical means of, e.g., internet, mobile phone or techniques of 
marketing - see Al-Kaida. 
 
2.3 Institutional framework of individualization 
 
As individualization means „institutionalized individualism”, Ulrich Beck considers macro-
institutions as conditions of or incentives for individualization. If we compare these conditions 
of individualization between - let’s say - the year 1983 and today, we get an analytical tool 
which helps us to analyse changes in society. 1983 was both the year when Beck first published 
his theorem of individualization and - at least in Germany - the stage, when “welfare 
individualization” was more and more replaced by - what calls Beck - “individualization 
against the background of precarious living conditions”. 
 
For the sixties, seventies and early eighties of the 20th century we can reconstruct - each time - 
rising factors of individualization4: [see in appendix] 
 
Each of these factors gives incentives that allow for or compel more individualization. 
Particularly important is the labour market, which Beck calls the “motor of individualization”. 
You have to decide a professional carrier, to stylise yourself as the best among the competitors, 
to prove your freedom from your local environment (mobility), to attain an adequate education 
which itself gives you incentives of self-reflection, et cetera. Uprooting, individualising effects 
were also induced in 19th century, but were then often foiled by collective labour experiences 
and mass protests. While these protests succeeded in the creation of the social security and 
social state rules, those collectivisation effects more and more vanished, and the social security 
systems themselves developed individualising effects: Pension insurance, e.g. „liberates“ from 
dependency on family ties. 
 
What has changed in 2007, compared with 1983?  
 
There are some minor changes: With the use of internet, e-mail and mobile phone one can 
presume more individualising communication effects. Leisure time and especially income 
tended in some Western European countries (!) - to stagnate or even decrease, thus having de-
individualising effects; the opposite development  has started in Eastern Europe 
 
Some new contextual factors have to be added: Intensified economic globalisation, security 
concerns and a rising consciousness for global ecological problems will certainly influence 
individualization, maybe - altogether - negatively: On the one hand, we can clearly state that 
due to globalised competition in the product and labour markets, individualising impulses have 
certainly increased. Perhaps more important is, however, that welfare-state regulations have 
been reduced in the last decade. If one adds the rising consciousness of ecological problems 
                                                 
4 Michael Hainz: Dörfliches Sozialleben und Individualisierung, Bonn 1999: 18. 
 
 and security concerns (the - so defined - “war against terrorism”, which disguises the US-
American struggle for oil and political domination), one can expect - and already perceive - a 
more collective cultural move: In situations of perceived danger people tend to join 
communities for security reasons. Already control cameras have gained more legitimacy than 
the right of informational self-determination. Is there or will there even be a even much  
stronger trend to collectivisation? Beck himself argues - only partly convincingly, I think - that 
one has to take serious the already attained level of individualization: Today individuals will 
create or access groups and institutions not in a traditional, pre-scripted way, but with high 
claims on their own, free decision-making - this would mean a voluntary, freely chosen access 
to institutions and a liberal regime „within“them. 
 
2.4 Why has individualization become so important? 
 
Why has “individualization” become a key word of present modernity? What are the reasons 
that, as Beck writes, ?the ethic of individual self-fulfillment and achievement is the most 
powerful current in the modern world? (2001: 22)? 
 
Beck rejects explanations which trace this growth of individual striving back to individual will 
or, negatively, to egoism. Instead of such an individual ascription, Beck refers to a structural 
reason: to the high level of functional differentiation in the present society. Present society, 
according also to his argument, breaks down into separate functional spheres, e.g. economy, 
politics, science, education, mass media and so on with all their subdivisions. “People are 
integrated into society only in their partial roles as taxpayers, car drivers, students, consumers, 
voters, patients, producers, fathers, pedestrians.  Constantly changing between different, partly 
incompatible logics of action, they are forced to take into hands that which is in danger of 
breaking into pieces: their own lives? (2001: 23). Thus individualization emerges from the 
structurally produced free spaces which an ever more differentiated society has opened up. 
  
Another explanation refers to systems theory: Modern society has to deal with such complex 
and quickly changing situations that restrictive, detailed rules become obsolete and have to be 
replaced by abstract media (money, law) which impose a certain incentive to act upon a 
“generously limited” field of action which requires therefore that the actors themselves use 
their individual liberty in order to duly correspond to these circumstances. Individualization is 
so understood as a modern form of social control. Interestingly, its unpleasant character of 
“control” is concealed and “out-manaeuvered” by the highly esteemed cultural value of liberty: 
It’s you, the individual, who feels free by, at the same time, “socially” controlling yourself anc 
your actions according the requests of society!5
 
An even more critical explanation of the vast interest in individualization looks at its 
ideological connotations. As Beck's counterpart Karl Otto Hondrich6 has put it: 
Individualization has become so popular because it contains a ”component of redemption”: 
Persons, who felt so restricted and sick within family, village or class traditions, saw 
                                                 
5Cornelia Hahn: Soziale Kontrolle und Individualisierung. Zur Theorie moderner Ordnungsbildung, Opladen 
1995. 
6Karl Otto Hondrich: Zur Dialektik von Individualisierung und Rückbindung am Beispiel der Paarbeziehung, in: 
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (48 Jg.) 1998, B 53/98, S. 3-8. 
 
 individualization as a promise of liberation. So individualization has become more a religious 
term than a social scientific one - according to Hondrich. 
 
2.5 Strengths and limits of Beck’s approach 
 
Positively, one can say that the theorem of individualization is a helpful concept in order to 
better understand modern attitudes to life and a lot of changes e.g. in family life, community 
patterns or religious bricolage. Professional sociologists acknowledge Beck's innovative 
function to open up new, more adequate concepts of sociology, but they criticize his lack of 
both empirical data and theoretical accurateness. Poverty researchers attack him for unduly 
overstretching the special habits of the educated middle-class to the whole society  
 
From my point of view, his theorem of individualization is a great challenge to theology, 
because he combines of true description of modern life conditions, an earthly promise of 
redemption and a restrained idea of human being, which is not open to transcendence. 
Sociologically, I only mention two problems: (1) Beck systematically underestimates the meso-
level (e.g. social movements). (2) With regard to the central importance of complex individual 
decision-making, Beck only looks in the direction of more individual options which he 
generally values too positively. He overlooks what Ralf Dahrendorf7 has called - in German - 
„Ligaturen”, which means bonds, values, cultural priorities that are necessary conditions in 
order to decide between different options. Lack of such culturally-based criteria means that 
(most) contemporaneous European  societies are located like in an untouched desert: 
Practically all directions are open to be chosen, but there are not enough indications, which 
help to find the proper way. 
 
Today, because of a new reflectivity on such orientations for decision-making and because of 
structural reasons (reduced welfare state, ecology, security concerns) I think that we - at least in 
Germany and other Western European countries - have already exceeded the zenith of 
individualization and are now in a backward movement: Options are getting closed or even less 
estimated, whereas aspects of belonging, values, criteria of “good life” et cetera are more 
looked for.  
 
 
3. Breakdown of traditional religiosity, new spiritual longing, strong “brands” in 
competition and persistent secularization: on diverse religious landscapes in Europe  
 
I organize this part by first mentioning historical factors for the religious diversity between 
European countries, and then looking at actual religious trends in three steps: Which 
phenomena do we perceive? How do we interpret these? What do their causes tell about present 
society?   
  
3.1 Which historical factors differentiate between European countries and regions? 
 
More than in economic or political spheres, we find a plurality in matters of religion in Europe. 
                                                 
7 Lebenschancen. Anläufe zur sozialen und politischen Theorie”, Frankfurt (Suhrkamp)1979. 
 
 Following the concepts of David Martin8, a British sociologist of religion, I hint at some 
historical categories, which altogether determine the religious vitality in a given country or 
regional situation. Martin always asks what crucial historical events have shaped religion in a 
given country or region. To summarise his arguments: 
- The reaction to the Reformation: Protestant countries are, as a rule, comparatively more 
secularized than catholic ones, but: 
- the kind of relation between political power and religion: Strong alliances between the throne 
and altar were always negative for religion (see, e.g., the revolutions in France and in Russia, 
and the state churches in Scandinavia). Former alliances between the throne and altar were the 
more negative for religion, the more radicals had to fight against a monolithic society, which 
was hold together by communitarian catholic or orthodox denominational bonds - whereas 
protestant societies let more room for pluralistic dissent, so avoiding disastrous fights against a 
whole state-church-complex;  
- the degree of religious monopolies vs. competition:  Competitive, entrepreneurial church 
situations are more vital than monopolistic ones regulated by the state;  
- the relation between nation and religion: Where religion has acted as „cultural defence“ 
(Steve Bruce), as in Ireland, Poland, Croatia, Slovakia, it has been strong; 
- the power of secularized elites to penetrate society, e.g. by education (more in French than in 
Turkey);  
- the geographic location: Peripheries (nations at the border to other civilisations like Greece 
or Poland) are more pious than centres. 
 
3.2 Which actual trends of religious phenomena do we perceive? 
 
I sketch three major trends in nowadays religious development in Europe: 
 
(1.) Processes of shrinking traditional, Church-related religiosity, namely a melting of 
previously closed strong denominational milieus and reductions in religious vocations, church 
membership, sacramental or prayer practices and beliefs. Please note that this „negative“ trend 
has exceptions, as we will see later, and it is not the only one, though for many the most painful 
one. 
 
(2.) Phenomena of more or less persistent secularity: 
 
a) Milieu-research shows that considerable parts of the generation “1968", of the looser-milieu 
of the “disconnected precariate”9, of the high establishment and of the young cultural avant-
garde, are “religious illiterates”.  
 
b) Surprisingly, elderly people also show unexpected high level of religious doubts. 
 
c) Atheist tendencies are most clearly marked in certain geographical areas, e.g., East 
Germany, Czech republic and Estonia. 
 
                                                 
8 On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory,   Aldershot a.o.(Ashgate) 2005  
9 Geo Neugebauer: Politische Milieus in Deutschland. Die Studie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn (Dietz) 2007. 
He speaks of the “abgehängte Prekariat”. 
 
 d) The most important subsystems of society do, according to their self-understanding, not 
need „external“ religious legitimization, correction or supplement. Economy and science 
(especially biology and neural-sciences) seem to be most reluctant, but also the other 
subsystems (politics, media, arts) show a great self-assurance and less and less respect for 
traditional church (status)- positions.  
 
e) We can also notice some sort of church-produced secularity, e.g. as results of sex-scandals 
(e.g. Ireland, Austria), of authoritarian church government (e.g. the dioceses of Chur and 
Ratisbon) or because of lack of respect to the faithful by priests (e.g. sometimes in Poland).  
 
(3.) A new emergence of religious symbols, practices and issues, which are multilayered: 
Is this a new religious springtime? Let's differentiate seven developments: 
 
(a) Religious topics and symbols get more visible in the cultural sphere: in vanguard theatres, 
as new religious impartiality in lyrics and novels, in the growing number of books on angels, as 
main trend in modern films - from “Superman returns” to Mil Gibson’s “Passion of Christ”.10
 
(b) In marketing and the presentation of consumer goods, religious symbols are often 
intentionally used: “Put on your Nike-shoes, because here is holy ground” (after: Exodus 3,5). 
 
(c) In remarkable parts of philosophy (e.g. Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, philosophy of 
religion), psychology (e.g., new, religiously positive interpretation of Sigmund Freund’s 
intentions) and even sociology (e.g., José Casanova, Hans Joas) we find religiously more open 
or even committed religious positions.  
 
(d) Religion and how to cope with religion have become “hot issues” in proceedings at law and 
in the media - the more religion has to do with conflict and the more it looks like exotic. 
 
(e) For more than twenty years we find neo-spiritual scenes at the edge or outside of 
Christianity. Esoteric movements may be of less public interest now, but “spirituality” (often 
instead of “religion”!) has become very influential in its aspirations and social forms: People 
long for “deeper”, touching experiences; they make spiritual experiments in privatised, fluid 
social settings. As „pilgrims“ they consequently follow their own individual spiritual way and 
are more unscrupulous than ever as they cross borders of religious systems. 
 
(f) Other world religions are now more visible and influential within Europe: Islam, Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Pentecostal churches and African religious groups. They are most frequently 
religions of immigrants, but are also induced by marriages, tourism, and other forms of 
conversions of locals. 
 
(g) Also within European Christianity we find trends of new religious vitality: at mega-events 
(World youth days, visits of the pope), in strong pious, relatively conservative or even 
authoritarian, „brands“ (some new religious orders or spiritual movements), but also in profiled 
pastoral settings (e.g., „youth churches“, city-pastoral, work with artists, online-retreats, 
                                                 
10 For Germany, see: Herderkorrespondenz Spezial Oktober 2006: Renaissance der Religion - Mode oder 
Megatrend? 
 
 “retreats on the roads”, new religious open-door offers, contemplation courses, new missionary 
activities). 
 
3.3 How to interpret this new visibility of religious symbols and actors? 
 
(1) Epistemologically, the situation is much more open than decades before: People accept as 
true more of that which transcends reason. 
 
(2) But be careful: Partially the boom of that which looks like “religion” is in fact not a 
strengthening, but a weakening of the religious. This can be said at least in two cases: 
(a) The fact, that religious symbols are more frequently used in advertisements and in films is 
indeed a signal that „religion sells“; but often it can at the same time substantially weaken 
religion, because it de-constructs contents and forms of traditional religion, whose 
representation does not any more follow a religious logic, but mainly an economic or only an 
aesthetic one. 
(b) Also, the more frequent public appearance of religious issues cannot be equated with 
growing religious convictions and practices, because it often comes from  an outside, third-
person-perspective and derives from non-religions motives, e.g, for fear of conflicts attributed 
to “the” Islam, or in the instrumental intention to mobilise moral resources of religion against 
undesired societal developments (e.g., cloning of humans). Also, empirically, there is – till now 
– only scarce evidence, that the new visibility of religous symbols translates into increases of 
religous practices and beliefs.11
 
(3) Similarly, the new impartiality of the religious in art follows partly from the fact that the 
churches have lost control of this field. 
 
(4) At a majority of people who call themselves “religious” or “spiritual” today - except from 
the very committed or even fundamentalist part - religiosity differs from that fifty years ago 
and is, measured in traditional terms, weaker than their older counterparts:  
(a) Religious socialisation today is less deep and less effectively „imprints“the whole life. 
(b) More important than dogma and morals is religious feeling: You have to be touched - in 
soul and body. 
(c) The link between religious beliefs on the one hand and behaviour, especially social 
behaviour, on the other hand, has considerably weakened: “Spirituality” nowadays often goes 
together without any interest in justice. 
 
(5) Altogether, more than just a simple comeback of traditional religion, a patchy, inconsistent 
mix of contemporary religiousness emerges. This pluralisation will amplify, also due to 
demography. It will also politically get (more) radicalised, where religious divisions and socio-
economic exclusions overlap and massively reinforce themselves. 
 
                                                 
11 New religious vitality is indicated in: Yves Lambert: A Turning Point in Religious Evolution in Europe: in 
Journal of Contemprary Religion 19 (2004) 29-45 (increased, also Church related, religiosity of the young 
generation), and in: Paul Michael Zulehner: Wiederkehr der Religion? In: Denz, H. (ed.): Die europäische Seele. 
Leben und Glauben in Europa, Wien (Czernin) 2002: 23-41 (increased religiosity in some urban, metropolitan 
areas). 
 
 3.4 How to explain this religious landscape? From religion back to society 
 
If we analyse the causes for central developments of the contemporary religious landscape, we 
do at the same time interpret important features of our European societies. But what are, in the 
sociology of religion, the central questions in need of explanation? I suggest the following one: 
How to explain the simultaneous phenomena of new religious interest and persistent secularity? 
 
Starting from the latter aspect, I refer to Jose Casanova's fascinating book „Public Religions in 
the Modern World“ (1994), and especially to the first of his three theses on secularisation: This 
thesis of functional differentiation means the emancipation of the mundane spheres of 
economy, politics, science, art etc from Church influence and their growing autonomy, which 
in its consequences (namely the separation between the mundane and the religious and the 
successful functioning of the mundane spheres) is still a main practical problem for religious 
persons today – in spite of the helpful theological insights at Vatican II in Gaudium et spes 36 
and 76. 
 
Deepening the differentiation-argument from a micro-perspective, Joerg Stolz (Lausanne, 
Switzerland) has recently argued that now an extensive range of secular competitors (from 
welfare state to wellness industry and ritual entrepreneurs et cetera) offers more reliable and 
more effective immanent and, so the perception by some, also transcendent goods than those 
having been or actually being offered by the Church, thus leading to extensive secularising 
effects. 
   
But, at the same time, functional differentiation is also “religiously productive”: It has liberated 
religious actors (e.g. bishops, abbots) from economic and political functions, so strengthening 
their specific religious role. The question, however, arises, whether we have or had somehow 
lost the key for this religious logic. We may also ask whether the long-standing concentration 
on these emancipated, autonomous mundane spheres has caused a new religious longing: Has 
modernity itself become religiously productive? This brings me directly to the first aspect of 
my question, namely how to explain the new interest in religion. I suggest some hypotheses: 
 
(1) On a deep cultural level one might speak of a disillusion with the promises of modernity 
(see the critique of postmodernism or by Jürgen Habermas who speaks of “entgleisender 
Modernisierung” [“slipping up of modernization”]). There is an ongoing controversy on how 
our developed societies take up position with regard to Modernity and the Enlightenment. 
 
(2) On a more concrete level, one can, in the line of the argument of Norris and Inglehart12, 
argue that rising insecurities (e.g. risks of unemployment, divorce, dismantling of the welfare 
state) foster a more extensive look for stable religious anchor. As middle classes at risk have 
much to loose, it is them, who more than others look for spirituality and religious “protection”. 
 
(3) A similar direction is supposed in Ralf Dahrendorf’s desert-argument (see above): The 
new openness for religion can be understood as a trial to cope with that dilemma of modernity 
that we endlessly have to take decisions but lack of criteria for that. 
                                                 
12 Sacred and secular : religion and politics worldwide, Cambridge [u.a.] (Cambridge Univ. Press) 2004. 
 
  
(4) Another concrete side-effect of modernity: Vis-à-vis the routine, one-dimensionality, 
shallowness and rationality of modernity (everyday work, consume, media...), the wish of 
re-enchantment (“Wiederverzauberung”, the reverse of Max Weber s argument) may grow: 
The longing for spirituality as a counter-effect of the rationalised modernity. Insofar as the 
Church is perceived as a rationalized, non-spiritual bureaucracy (often persons looking for 
meditation and prayer, do not find priests who are able to show them how to pray and to guide 
them spiritually!), the de-institutionalisation from church can partly be interpreted as a rejection 
of this disliked aspect of modernity.   
 
(5) Approaches of globalisation and religious economics: Side effects of globalisation, like 
migration, tourism and internet, make available new religious ideas and new religious actors 
(e.g. Buddhists, Moslems, Pentecostal entrepreneurs). The more numerous religious suppliers 
are in a given market, the more they try hard to offer attractive religious activities: In the end, 
religiosity and spirituality will get more vital - so the essence of this argument, brought forward 
by Rodney Stark, Roger Finke, Laurence Iannacone and others. There is certainly a new 
competition between religions in Europe, but I join those sociologists of religions (Steve Bruce, 
Joerg Stolz) who criticise a non-reflected religious use of economic concepts like “markets” 
and “goods”. No colonisation of religion by means of economics! 
 
 
Appendix: Factors of Individualization (see p. 6) 
 
 
   education     spatial and social mobility 
    
     
 
labour market                         social/welfare systems
   competition     
 
use of media        
            claiming of individual rights 
   life expectancy 
   leisure time 
   income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
